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Abstract
It has been observed people tend to have opinions that are far more
internally consistent than it would be reasonable to expect. Here, we
study how that observation might emerge from changing how agents trust
the opinions of their peers in a model for opinion dynamics with mul-
tiple issues. A previous Bayesian inspired opinion model for continuous
opinions is extended to include multiple issues. In the original model,
agents tended to trust less opinions that were too different from their
own. We investigate the properties of the extended model in its natural
form. And we also introduce the possibility the trust of the agent might
depend not only on the specific issue but on the average opinions over the
many issues. By adopting such a ideological point of view, we observe an
important decrease in the spread of individual opinions.
1 Introduction
Here, we will present an opinion dynamics model [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] where
the opinions exist over an one-dimensional axis and each agent has a best esti-
mate on more than one issue over that axis. Describing opinions over a spatial
landscape is an usual way to describe policy alternatives and agents’ prefer-
ences. The geometrical properties of the space are usually defined by mapping
from similarity to proximity of the political agents [8, 9]. Such a description
can capture the common notion of parties or policies being more “to the left”
or “right”. If they’re similar then they’re closer [10, 11]. Major opinions, in-
cluding political ones, tend to be formed not from only one issue but from how
each person feels about a number of them. Locating someone in a left versus
right or liberal versus conservative axis, therefore, requires inspecting the opin-
ions of that person in not only one but several issues that constitute the agent
ideological positioning [12].
For many problems, it makes sense to consider different issues as having
components in more than one single dimension [13]. However, it is often the
case that describing the problem as one-dimensional can be justified. We can
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certainly see this as a first approximation along the most relevant dimension. In
that case, the one dimensional case is just a projection along a direction where
variation seems especially important of higher-dimensional problems. From an
application point of view, it is usual to find discussions to be simplified over
only one main disagreement.
One traditional way to model this type of scenario is to use continuous opin-
ions over a fixed interval, as it is done in the Bounded Confidence (BC) models
[6, 14]. While discrete models [3, 4, 5] can be very useful at describing choices,
they are not easiest way to represent strength of opinion unless a continuous
variable is associated to the choice [7]. Discrete models also tend to lack a scale
where we can compare opinions and decide which one is more conservative or
more liberal.
On the other hand, continuous models are not particularly well suited for
problems involving discrete decisions. As we will not deal with those kinds of
problems here, they are a natural choice. Indeed, continuous opinions models
have been proposed for several different problems on how opinions spread on
a society [15, 16], from questions about the spread of extremism [17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22] to other issues such as how different networks [23, 24, 25, 26] or the
uncertainty of each agent [27] might change how agents influence each other.
Here, we will use a continuous opinion model created by Bayesian-like rea-
soning [28], inspired by the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA)
model [7, 29]. That model was shown previously [28] to provide the same quali-
tative results as BC models. While a little less simple, the Bayesian basis makes
for a clearer interpretation of the meaning of the variables. That makes ex-
tending the model and interpreting new results simple. That approach is also
consistent with a bounded rationality variant interpretation of the spatial model
of political decision making [30, 31].
Variations of how each agent estimate how trustworthy other agents are will
also be introduced. Here, we use a function of trust p∗ that plays a role similar
to the threshold value in BC models. While p∗ is not a simple discontinuous
cut-off, it is a function of the distance between the opinions of the agent and
the neighbor. If only one issue is debated, that distance is uniquely defined.
However, if we have multiple issues represented on the same one-dimensional
line, it is not clear which distance we should use. That happens because we
have the opinion of agent i on a specific issue oi and we can compare it to oj to
estimate how much i trusts j. However, as there are several issues we could also
use the mean opinion of i over all its issues and the same goes for j. Therefore,
we will study two additional cases: in the first alternative, we will change p∗
to p∗∗, determined by the distance between the neighbor and the agent average
opinions. In the second alternative, we will use a p∗∗∗ calculated from the
opinion of the neighbor and the average opinion of the agent. The idea here is to
make the behavior of our agents closer to what experiments show about human
reasoning. We have observed that our reasoning about political problems can
be better described as ideologically motivated [32, 33, 34]. Indeed, our opinions
tend to come in blocks even when the issues are logically independent [35]. Our
reasoning abilities seem to exist more to defend our main point of views [36, 37]
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and our cultural identity [38] than to find the best answer. In that context,
evaluating others by how they differ from us as a whole, instead of in each issue,
is a model variation worth exploring.
2 The Model
Here, the population will consist of N agents fully connected (an agent
i can interact with any other agent j). Each agent i will have an opinion
0 ≤ oik ≤ 1, where k = 1, . . . , n is a specific issue. We assume each agent opinion
about issue k can represented as a value oik at the range of possible values for
os. Agents also have an uncertainty σ associated to their average estimate o.
The uncertainty σ could be different for each agent and also updated during
the interactions [28]. For the sake of simplicity, however, we will assume the
uncertainty σi = σ is identical for (almost) all agents and it does not change.
The set of opinions for each agent on all possible issues will define its ideological
profile Ii = ((oi1, σ), . . . , (oin, σ)) , where n is the number of issues, o is the
opinion about the issue and σ is the global uncertainty [29]. The arithmetic
mean xi of agent i opinions in each issue will be called here the ideal point for
each agent, that is, it defines the agent ideological position at the dimension of
interest [39]. Obviously xi =
1
n
∑n
k=1 oik.
In order to have agents with initial ideal points well distributed over the
possible range, the initial valued for each oik was randomly drawn using a Beta
Be(α, β) with random parameters αi and βi. Those parameters were drawn for
each agent i from the ranges (α ∈ [1.1, 100], β ∈ [1.1, 100]) by dividing those
ranges by N equally spaced values and then assigning them to each agent after
mixing the values as in a Latin hypercube sampling [40]. That is done to allow
agents with a diverse value of initial ideal points and, at the same time, to keep
the initial oiks of each agent i correlated.
While we could have σ as a measurement of each agent uncertainty and
have it evolve with time, here we will keep it as a fixed parameter of the model.
However, a proportion p intran of agents will be stubborn about one single
issue k, so that σik = 1e− 20. That behavior is kept constant as the simulation
unfolds, that is σik is also not updated by the model. A proportion of agents
who are stubborn is introduced here so we can check if inflexible [41, 42, 43]
have a significant impact on the outcomes of the model.
In each iteration of the simulation, two procedures are applied: the opinion
update through social influence, and a random opinion update (noise). In the so-
cial influence procedure we draw two agents, i and j, from the population, where
i will observe j opinion about a randomly drawn issue k ∈ (1, . . . , n). Agent
i updates its opinion (oik) following an approximate Bayesian rule. That rule
is obtained by assuming each agent has a Normal prior fi(θ) =
1√
2piσi
e
− (θ−oi)22σi
compatible with its parameters oi and σi, where the index related to the is-
sue k was omitted for the sake of simplifying the equation. The agents also
assume a mixture likelihood where there is an initial chance p, updated to p∗
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that the agent j has information and a chance 1 − p it knows nothing and its
opinion is just a random non-informative draw. That is, the likelhood is given
by f(oj |θ) = pN(θ, σ2j ) + (1− p)U(0, 1). While a full Bayesian treatment would
produce a posterior distribution that is a mixture of two normals, here we will
assume each agent only updates its expected value and it does not carry the full
posterior information to the next iteration. That leads to the following update
rule for the expected value oi,k [29]:
oik(t+ 1) = p
∗ oik(t) + ojk(t)
2
+ (1− p∗)oik(t), (1)
where p∗ is given by
p∗ =
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (∆ij)
2
2σ2
i
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (∆ij)
2
2σ2
i + (1− p)
. (2)
Here ∆ij = oik(t) − ojk(t) is the distance between the opinions on the k issue.
∆ij plays a similar role to the threshold parameter in the Bounded Confidence
models by making distant opinions less influential. As ∆ij increases, it is easy
to see that Equation2 causes p∗ to tend to zero. And, as that happens, the
weights in average update Equation 1 change so that the previous value oi,k(t)
remains almost unchanged.
The threshold role of ∆ij suggests we might change its definition to check
how it might better reflect the actual behavior of humans. In particular, people
tend to trust better those who have a similar ideology. That means trust might
not depend on the specific issue alone, but on the average over all issues. While
that is not the model we obtain from applying Bayes rule, such a change makes
sense as an attempt to have a better model. In order to check that possibility we
will also implement two other cases by changing the way ∆ij is calculated. In the
first variation, p∗ will be substituted by p∗∗, where p∗∗ means ∆ij = xi(t)−xj(t),
that is, agent i will observe the average ideological position of j in order to
estimate its trust. That assumed i has more information than only the value
ojk(t). To check what happens when only ojk(t) can be observed by agent i, we
will introduce a second variant case where i compares ojk(t) to its own average.
That is, ∆ij = xi(t)− ojk(t) and we represent that case by p∗∗∗.
In order to better understand the model dynamics we also introduce noise as
the second procedure. At each iteration, another agent i is randomly chosen and
its opinion changed due to random noise. That is, i opinion becomes oik(t+1) =
oik(t)+r where r is drawn from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation ρ. If agent i is intransigent in issue k it won’t its oik opinion when
chosen by the noise algorithm. Moreover, if oik(t) + r > 1 then oik(t + 1) = 1.
Likewise, if oik(t) + r < 0 then oik(t+ 1) = 0. Noise is introduced here as a way
of accounting for the effect of factors not related to the modeled social influence
[44] and it is interesting to verify if small noises can lead to drastic changes in
systemic properties [45].
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3 Model Results
To better understand the model behavior, we ran simulations using as range
for the parameters the values:
σ n p p intran N ρ
[0.01, 0.5] [1, 10] [0.1, 0.99] [0.0, 0.1] [500, 5000] (0.0, 0.1]
Table 1: Parameters’ Bounds
The parameter space was explored by two sweeps of its parameters: one
sampling of 70,000 times using quasi-random low-discrepancy sequences on all
parameters [46], that generate evenly spaced points, and another of 60,000 times
keeping N = 500 so that we can compare different runs. An interesting question
in any opinion dynamics model is if agents can reach consensus, if they diverge,
or something between those two states. That can be observed by comparing the
initial mean and standard deviation of each agent’s opinions. Figure 1 shows
histograms for those variables at the initial condition and also for the final
opinions corresponding to the (p∗, p∗∗, p∗∗∗) cases. The upper graphic shows
the distribution of the mean opinions xi, and the lower one the distribution of
the standard deviation of the opinions of each agent s2i ==
1
n
∑n
k=1(oik − xi)2.
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(a) Initial x Final state:
Distribution of mean opinions
(b) Initial x Final state:
Distribution of the standard deviations of opinions
Figure 1: Difference between initial and final opinion
distributions for 60.000 parameterizations. In all
cases, N = 500.
The histograms show that, in general, opinions have a tendency to move
towards the middle value. This seems to suggest most parameter values lead
to consensus or near it. However, consensus is not always achieved, as shown
by the tails of the mean distribution at Figure 1, even if the final distribution
shows that extreme opinions become less common. And we can also observe
in the distribution of standard deviations si that the opinions of each agent on
each issue tend to become more diverse, as, for most cases, si seems to increase
from its initial values. The only exception is the p∗∗∗ scenario. There, we still
see an increase in the frequency of large values of si. But there are also many
cases where there is a strong tendency for si to become smaller. Or, in other
words, in several scenarios, the agents opinions on the issues tended to gather
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much closer to their own mean opinions xi as a consequence of the dynamics.
The cases where the average opinions remain a little spread, while rare,
correspond to scenarios where bi-partisanship survives, with agents opinions
surviving at both extreme positions. This suggests that, in general, the model
can be described as one with similarity biased influence [44]. This tendency to
consensus seems to be a little weaker at the p∗ case when compared to the two
other cases, p∗∗ and p∗∗∗.
Figure 1 (b) also shows that in all cases (p∗, p∗∗, p∗∗∗) the standard deviation
of the opinions distribution becomes more spread. While there are situations
where si tends to become smaller, signaling the agent opinions become closer
to its mean, the reverse also happens. The tails for larger values of si show
that the intercation with other agents quite often led to a more diverse set
of opinions over the different issues. As a matter of fact, except for the p∗∗∗
scenarios, a larger internal spread than in the initial conditions seem to be the
usual result. For p∗∗∗, while we also observe that strenghtening of the spread
for many parameter values, we also see that an increase in cases with small si.
That is, the dynamics can lead to stronger internal consistency.
The distributions for the mean and standard deviation might look contra-
dictory at a first glance. But they are information about different quantities. A
tendency of the xi towards central value while si increases is simple to under-
stand. It just shows that, while opinions on different issues might be spreading
more, including towards more extreme values, the mean of every issue opinion
of the agents show a clear central tendency. That the mean would have a cen-
tral tendency should not be seen as a surprise. But that does not necessarily
correspond to what happens to the agents opinions on specific issues oik.
7
Figure 2: Histogram for the final distribution of values of oik. Initial distribution
is also shown for comparison.
The behavior of the opinions about specific issues oik values when we have
small values of σ can be observed in the Figure 2. The graphics show sepa-
rate cases for different number n of issues and distinct small values of σ. The
stronger central tendency. While the most important peak is still around 0.5,
the distribution of values is now much more spread. That reflects the fact that,
as σ decreases, consensus becomes much harder and a fraction of the agents find
agreement at other values. Indeed, in every graphic, for the p∗ scenario, central
opinions become less common than in initial conditions, while more extreme val-
ues become predominant, showing a clear tendency away from consensus. The
same is not true for the more centralizing versions, p∗∗ and p∗∗∗, that seems to
show a more varied behavior. For σ ≤ 0.05, both cases show some tendency to
consensus. As for σ ≤ 0.02, we see very small changes in the initial distribution,
when n = 6 or n = 10, and a clear drive to disagreement when n = 2. In all
scenarios, however, it is clear that the tendency to disagreement is weaker when
update is done following the p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ rules than what we observe for p∗.
The histograms, however, don’t show the whole story of which parameters
influence the system behavior. With that in mind we performed a Sobol sen-
sitivity analysis [47] using as outcome both the observed standard deviation of
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agent’s mean opinions Y std2 == 1n
∑n
k=1(xi − x¯i)2 and the standard deviation
Ss of the collection of N internal standard deviations si. The Sobol indexes
decompose the impact of parameters on the variance of the output. The higher
the value of index the bigger the impact of the parameter on the output. First
order Sobol indexes include linear and non-linear contributions of the param-
eters, while total Sobol indexes also include all the interaction effects between
parameters [48]. If there are only three parameters, the total effect ST1 of the
first parameter X1 is given by the equation ST1 = S1 + S12 + S13 + S123 where
Si =
V [E(Y |Xi)]
V (Y ) ; S12 is the impact at the variance of the output Y of the in-
teraction of X1 and X2; that is, their combined effect minus their first order
effects: Sij =
V [E(Y |Xi,X,)]−V [E(Y |Xi)]−V [E(Y |Xj)]
V (Y ) [46]. For our simulations, we
obtain the estimates:
Figure 3: Sobol Indexes for the three cases (p∗, p∗∗, p∗∗∗). First column shows
the analysis for Y std and the second column, for Ss.
The sensitivity analysis in Figure3 shows that σ, n, and ρ have the most
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influence on the final values of Y std and Ss. p seems to still have some smaller
influence and both N and pintran seem to make no difference for the range of
values we used. It is also interesting to notice that the same general behavior
appears in the three scenarios for Y std. σ being the parameter that explains
most of the variance was expected and it is consistent with [29]. It is interesting
to see that two of the new parameters, the number of issues n and the noise ρ,
also play an important role in explaining the total variance of Y std.
When we look at the standard deviation of the agent’s opinions, Ss, however,
we see that σ is the most relevant parameter only for the p∗ case. For p∗∗ and
p∗∗∗, however, σ seems to matter very little, basically as much as p. And the
noise ρ seems to have most of the impact on Ss. This change is not so hard to
understand. As we are speaking of how much change we observe in the standard
deviations of each agent opinions si, there is a fundamental difference between
the p∗ scenario and the p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ ones. On the first one, the opinion of i in
each issue does not depend on its own opinion on other issues. However, as in
both p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ agent i uses its own mean to decide own much to trust other
agents, it is natural i opinions will tend to a mean value. So, while for p∗, si
is driven by how much the opinions get spread in general and, therefore, by σ
, p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ scenarios suggest that the tendency to keep consistent opinions
predominates and the variation in the final results is driven mostly by the noise.
This is compatible with what we observed Figure 1 for the distribution of si.
There, we had that the p∗ showed it was common to observe agents with very
little internal consistency, equivalent to large amounts of si. The tail for high
si, however, was significantly smaller for p
∗∗ and p∗∗∗, with p∗∗∗ even showing
cases where very small si became more frequent than in the initial distribution.
A sensitivity analysis, however, does not show the direction of the impact.
Figure 4 shows scatter plots for Y std as a function of the main parameters.
Each point corresponds to the outcome of one implementation of the model for
the value of the parameter at the x-axis and the observed value of Y std. Similar
scatter plots for Ss showed similar behaviors and, therefore, are not shown here.
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Figure 4: Scatterplots for the parameters with highest impact. Each dot corre-
sponds to the result obtained in a single run.
The negative impact of σ in the population’ opinion dispersion is expected:
a higher σ means agents are easier to influence. As they are connected to all
the other agents, the more uncertain they are, the more centralized the agents’
mean opinions will tend to become. The plots also show that the exact value
of σ seems to matter little above approximately 0.1. Therefore we restrict our
following analysis to σ in the (0.0, 0.1] range. The effect of ρ is also expected: the
bigger the noise, the more dispersed the final state of the system is. The number
of issues n seems to have little influence unless it is n = 1. When there is only
one issue, we see scenarios where the opinions clearly move away to stronger
polarizations, with (Y std) around 0.3. Those cases are no longer observed as
we have at least two issues. That is probably an artifact of initial conditions.
As initial conditions were randomly drawn, extreme values in all issues become
more and more rare with increasing number of issues n and, therefore, there are
very few agents to push others to the more extreme regions.
Now we have a general picture, looking at typical behaviors for specific
parameter values helps us understand the model better. We ran cases where
we kept ρ = 0.05 ; N = 500 ; p intran = 0.0 fixed, for 500.000 iterations, and
test combinations of σ = (0.02, 0.04, 0.1) and n = (1, 5, 10). The time series at
Figure 5 show the time evolution of the opinions of all 500 agents for a typical
run of the the p∗ ∗ ∗ case. Only results for p∗ ∗ ∗ are shown here because the
time series for p∗ and p∗∗ are visually almost identical to the ones in the figures.
We see that larger values σ seem to lead opinions towards the center: the bigger
the σ is, the more agents will tend to move closer to the mean.
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Figure 5: Time series for the parameterization: ρ = 0.05, N = 500, p intran =
0.0, n = 1 or 2
Figure 6 shows a similar time evolution series for n = 5 issues. Here, even
for small values of σ we observe the opinions tend to avoid the more extreme
values. As commented before, that seems to be an artifact of initial random
draws. While it is easy to draw the most extreme values with only one draw,
for n = 5, as we are close to the end of the range, no values outside that range
are possible. So, the most extreme values require that, at the start, agents
should have all their five issues drawn as extreme. As that is rare, those few
that do start there tend to be attracted to still extreme positions, but a little
less so. However, there actually seems to be a stronger tendency towards more
central opinions. That can be observed as the increase in σ leads to a position
closer to consensus than we observed in Figure 5 for the n = 1 case.
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Figure 6: Time series for the parameterization: ρ = 0.05, N = 500, p intran =
0.0
A possible reason we need to check is the fact we are measuring the mean
opinion values xi. As ρ changes a single oi at each iteration, that means a higher
n should imply a lesser impact of ρ on the mean opinion of the agent. That
could explain why, for a larger n, consensus might come easier. To test if that
was what was actually happening, we ran the same scenarios but increasing ρ
with n, such that ρ2 =
√
n ∗ ρ1. The effects of increasing ρ that way in the case
of Figure 6 can be seen at Figure 7. A comparison with Figure 5 shows a larger
spread around the consensus, suggesting there might be other effects here other
than random fluctuations.
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Figure 7: Time series for the parameterization: ρ ≈ 0.12, N = 500, p intran =
0.0
Heretofore we’ve tested parameterizations with noise. To verify the influence
of the existence of noise, we also ran cases with ρ close to zero,that is ρ = 10−5.
The most obvious difference we can see is that the population mean opinion
values converge to well defined values. In parameter combinations in which
σ = 0.1 the tendency is convergence to values close to 0.5. An interesting
distinction between the cases in this parameterization is that p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ always
converge to 0.5, independently of the number of issues. Alternatively, in the
p∗ case this happens when n = 1, but when we have n = 5 or 10 there are
other values of convergence, more as we increase n, even though the centralizing
tendency remains.
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Figure 8: Time series for the parameterization: ρ = 1e−5, N = 500, p intran =
0.0
When σ is around 0.02 or 0.04, we observe another difference between cases:
p∗ has more convergence values than p∗∗ and p∗∗∗. Figure 9 illustrates this
system behavior for σ = 0.02. We can also see that the standard deviations
si are very different for the p
∗ and p∗∗∗ cases. While for p∗, the values of si
range from small values around 0.02 to much larger values, up tp 0.2, in the
p∗∗∗ scenario we see that si tends to diminish with time, the majority of the
observed values getting close to zero.
15
Figure 9: Time series for the parameterization: ρ = 1e−5, N = 500, p intran =
0.0
The reason for that lies in how ∆ (that controls how much an agent will
trust others) is calculated in each case: in the p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ cases the update
rules make use of mean opinion values. That introduces a tendency for distinct
issues opinions to move towards each other. The p∗ update rule, however, works
with single issue opinions. As the issues are uncoupled, that allows the agents
to keep an ideologically more diverse profile.
Another impact of the number of issues, as shown in Figure 10, is that a
higher n leads to a longer time for the convergence. The reason is that we’re
only changing one opinion by iteration, so naturally a higher n means the agents
will take longer to be influenced. The relationship here is roughly linear such
that the plot the region at 5× 105 iterations when n = 10 is very similar to the
corresponding region at 0.5× 105 when n = 1.
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Figure 10: Time series for the parameterization: ρ = 1e−5, N = 500, p intran =
0.0.
4 Conclusions
Here, we have extended a previous model for continuous opinions [28] to
include the case where agents have opinions on n issues. We explored the
impact of the main parameters on the final results. The σ parameter, that
defines how much each agent trusts other with distant opinions and plays the
same role threshold values play in Bounded Confidence models, was observed to
be a major influence in the outcome of the simulations. The number of issues
n as well as the amount of noise ρ were also shown by our sensitivity analysis
to have important effects on the outcomes, while the initial general amount of
trust p as well as the number of agents N seemed to matter little.
As the model is based on an update rule where opinions always move towards
agreement (even if by a negligible amount), the tendency to central opinions is
expected. That is especially true for the average values xi. Since they are an
average of several opinions, a strong tendency to central values is expected from
simple statistical considerations. In order to see evidence of cases where the
final opinions show a splitting between several final values, we do have to look
at the individual opinions on each issue, oik. It is interesting to see that, at
least for the regular trust function p∗, the final distributions for oik show that
specific opinions might become quite spread over the range of possible values.
Testing different forms of trust functions also provided interesting results.
A Bayesian analysis of the problem suggests the rational choice would be just
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comparing the opinions of the agents on the specific issue. That is, how much
each agent i trusts an agent j should be a function of the distance between their
opinions on the subject k they are debating, that is, oik − ojk. However, as
humans do show a lot of ideologically motivated reasoning [36, 37, 38], it makes
sense to change how trust is calculated to a situation that is more compatible
with experiments. Two possibilities were considered here. In the first one, (p∗∗,
the trust was dependent on the distance between the agent average estimates
over all issues, that is, the trust function was a function of xi − xj . The second
possibility, p∗∗∗), considered that agent i was observing j opinion only on issue
k and, therefore, could only compare that value to its own average, that is the
trust function was a function of oik − xj .
Compared to the non-ideological case, both ideological trust functions showed
a tendency that each agent would have it own opinions show less diversity over
the set of issues. This could be easily observed by the larger proportion of
smaller values of si. That effect was particularly stronger for p
∗∗∗). As the
issues were always treated as independent, that tendency does correspond to
observing some irrational consistency [35]. The tendency to consistency was
not perfect, though, as large values of si were also observed as much more
common than those in the initial distributions. That suggests that, while the
mechanism of ideological trust might play an important role in the existence of
the irrational consistency effect, it probably can not account for the whole of
it. Other effects, such as confirmation biases, are also probably important to
describe the whole effect.
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